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Abstract
Static program analysis complements traditional dynamic testing by discovering generic patterns and rela-
tions in source code, which indicate software deﬁciencies such as memory corruption, unexpected program
behavior and memory leaks. Since static program analysis builds on approximations of a program’s concrete
behavior there is often a trade-oﬀ between reporting potential bugs that might be the result of an over-
approximation and silently suppressing those defects in that grey area. While this trade-oﬀ is less important
for small ﬁles it has severe implications when facing large software packages, i.e., 1, 000, 000 LoC and more.
In this work we report on experiences with using our static C/C++ analyzer Goanna on such large software
systems, motivate why a ﬂexible property speciﬁcation language is vital, and present a number of decisions
that had to be made to select the right checks as well as a sensible reporting strategy. We illustrate our
ﬁndings by empirical data obtained from regularly analyzing the Firefox source code.
Keywords: Source code analysis, static analysis, C/C++, false positive reduction, case study, Firefox.
1 Introduction
Traditional software testing is an integral part of the software quality assurance
process to validate the overall design, to ﬁnd bugs in the implementation and to
increase trust in the correctness of a system. The advantage of traditional testing
is that functional behavior of the software can be examined for the real implemen-
tation on the real hardware. This stands in contrast to, e.g., purely model-based
approaches. The disadvantage is that testing explores typically only a limited num-
ber of program behaviors. Even if all program paths are explored, only a limited set
of inputs can be examined, and signiﬁcant manual eﬀort is required to ﬁnd the ap-
propriate test cases. One of the most signiﬁcant disadvantages is that testing does
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not scale well to large code bases. There are typically an overwhelming number of
test cases to consider to achieve a satisfactory coverage.
Static program analysis [1,2] can alleviate some of the aforementioned disadvan-
tages. In contrast to traditional testing, static program analysis does not execute
the implementation, but analyzes the source code for known dangerous program-
ming constructs, for combinations of those and their causal relationships, and the
impact of potentially tainted input. Typical examples in C/C++ are null pointer
dereferences, accessing freed memory, memory leaks, or creating exploits through
buﬀer overruns. These types of bugs are only found to the extend in that they
aﬀect the functional behavior, and since traditional testing is focussed on checking
the functional behavior of the system, ﬁnding these types of bugs is more often a
welcomed side-eﬀect, rather than intentional. Because static program analysis can
pinpoint those software deﬁciencies directly, and because it is scalable to large code
bases and can be run fully automatically, it is a way to complement traditional
testing.
Static program analysis cannot always be precise, since it does not execute the
real code, but examines syntactic relations within the source code. This means,
over-approximations are used to estimate the actual program behavior. This almost
inevitably leads to false alarms, i.e., warnings which are spurious and do not corre-
late to any actual execution. In addition to these false alarms, there are warnings
that pinpoint code where the programmer bends the rules of the C/C++ standard,
often to achieve eﬃciency. From the programmers’ perspective these warnings are
often also considered to be false alarms. The art of static program analysis is to
minimize this grey area of potential false alarms of either type. There are three
options: Not reporting any bugs that might be the result of over-approximations,
adding semantic information to the analysis to make the approximation more pre-
cise, or reverting to an under-approximation all together, i.e., only consider deﬁnite
bugs in the analysis.
In this paper we present a number of results and experiences of developing a
static program analyzer from a tool builder’s point of view. In particular we look
at common software bugs and potential false alarms, which we discovered in large
source code bases. False alarms in this work comprise false positives as deﬁned
by formal language semantics, as well as unnecessary or superﬂuous alarms from a
tool user’s point of view. Based on practical observations we present a number of
dimensions to classify properties and bugs, and give detailed explanations why we
believe those dimensions to be appropriate and substantiate this by several example
deﬁciencies found in a large existing code base.
Moreover, we suggest practical measures and analysis techniques to improve
static program analysis results in general. To support our claims, we implemented
some of those measures in our static analyzer Goanna and report on the qualitative
results we obtained from analyzing the source code of Firefox, which has around
2, 500, 000 LoC after preprocessing.
The paper is structured as follows: In the subsequent Section 2 we summarize
the diﬀerent classes of static program analysis techniques and typical approaches
A. Fehnker et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 266 (2010) 17–3218
by modern static analysis tools. We brieﬂy describe the underlying technology of
our own analyzer Goanna in Section 3. The focus of this work is Section 4 where
we discuss the dimensions for classifying bugs, give example deﬁciencies, as well as
measures for improvement. Section 5 presents empirical data based on analyzing
Firefox, before Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Dimensions of Static Program Analysis
Static program analysis is a term that was coined by the compiler community for
a set of techniques to investigate program properties without actually executing
the program. In recent years those techniques have become popular not only for
compiler optimization, but to ﬁnd certain patterns in programs, that indicate bugs
or, more generally, software deﬁciencies.
In the latter half of this paper we introduce a number of categories that can be
used to classify warnings, which in turn help to select appropriate analysis tech-
niques. In this section we brieﬂy touch on the diﬀerent types of static analysis
techniques. The simplest type of analysis is just searching for keywords, potential
dangerous library calls and the like without considering any structural or additional
semantic information of the program. The more sophisticated the analysis becomes
the more computation is typically required, potentially slowing the analysis down.
We consider the following classes of analysis techniques:
Flow-sensitive analysis takes into account the control ﬂow of a program while a
ﬂow-insensitive analysis does not. E.g., taking loops and branching behavior into
account are characteristics of a ﬂow-sensitive analysis while typical text searches
are insensitive.
Path-sensitive analysis considers only valid program paths. This means, more
program semantics is considered like variable values conditionals that enables the
analysis to distinguish between feasible and infeasible paths.
Context-sensitive analysis takes the calling context of a function such as the
states of input parameters and global variables into account. It is a special case
of inter-procedural analysis, because it not only considers whole-program infor-
mation, but the actual diﬀerent program states in which a function is called.
Naturally, the more information that is available, the better the analysis results
become. However, from a practical point of view collecting and computing semantic
information can result in excessive computation, and slow down the analysis to a
point where it is not scalable to larger programs. In most circumstances a static
analysis tool is only regarded as useful if the analysis time is roughly in the same
order of magnitude as the compilation process and not several orders of magnitude
higher.
Apart from the semantic depth of the analysis there is a classiﬁcation on the
type of approximation. We distinguish between may- and must-analyses.
May-analysis considers over-approximations of program behavior. May analysis,
for example, might return as a result for a loop that indicates a speciﬁc variable
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1 void foo() {
2 int x, *a;
3 int *p=malloc(sizeof(int));
4 for(x = 10; x > 0; x--) {
5 a = p;
6 if(x == 1)
7 free(p)
8 }
9 }
l0
l1 mallocp
l2
l3 usedp
l4
l6
l5
freep
l7
Fig. 1. Example program and labeled CFG for use-after-free check.
is written after the loop, even if the analyzer itself cannot decide if this loop ever
terminates.
Must-analysis considers under-approximations of program behavior. Must anal-
ysis will not return, for the loop example above, that the same variable is written,
as it only considers those eﬀects that are guaranteed to happen.
While may-analysis can turn up signiﬁcantly more bugs, the detected bugs may
not exist in the actual program behavior due to infeasible paths or infeasible data
dependencies. In this context these warnings are called false positives (or false
alarms). Must-analysis, however, might miss bugs due to the nature of under-
approximation. We call these false negatives.
To complicate matters further, modern static program analyzers often mix over-
and under-approximations within the same analysis. For instance, the semantics of
pointer arithmetic might be under-approximated and the semantics of a loops over-
approximated. While not sound, those frameworks have proven to be most eﬀective
in turning up many bugs without generating many false alarms at the same time
[3]. Another complication is that the term false alarm is often used in a diﬀerent
way, motivated from the point of view point of a developer, or from the point of
view of a tester. Section 4 discusses these alternative uses.
3 The Goanna Approach to Static Analysis
In this work we use an automata based static analysis framework that is imple-
mented in our tool Goanna. In contrast to typical equation solving approaches to
static analysis, the automata based approach [4,5,6] deﬁnes properties in terms of
temporal logic expressions over annotated graphs. The validity of a property can
then be checked automatically by graph exploring techniques such as model check-
ing [7,8]. Goanna 2 itself is a close source project, but the technical details of the
approach can be found in [9].
The basic idea of our approach is to map a C/C++ program to its corresponding
2 http://www.redlizards.com
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control ﬂow graph (CFG), and to label the CFG with occurrences of syntactic
constructs of interest. The CFG together with the labels can easily be mapped to
the input language of a model checker or directly translated into a Kripke structure
for model checking.
A simple example of this approach is shown in Fig. 1. Consider the contrived
program foo which is allocating some memory, copying it a number of times to a,
and freeing the memory in the last loop iteration.
One example of a property to check is whether after freeing some resource,
it still might be used. In our automata based approach we syntactically identify
program locations that allocate, use, and free resource p. We automatically label
the program’s CFG with this information as shown on the right hand side of Fig. 1.
This property can then be checked by the following property in Computation Tree
Logic (CTL):
AG (mallocp ⇒ AG (freep ⇒ ¬EF usedp)),
where AG stands for “for all paths and in all states” and EF for “there exists a
path and there exist a state”. This means that whenever there is free after malloc
for a resource p, there is no path such that p is used later on.
One advantage of this automata based approach is that properties can be modi-
ﬁed easily to express stronger/weaker requirements by changing the path quantiﬁer,
i.e., changing an A to an E and vice versa. The following property
AG (mallocp ⇒ AG (freep ⇒ ¬AF usedp)),
is only violated if the resource p is used on all paths after being freed. While this
relaxed property does not pick up as many bugs as the previous one, it also does not
create as many false alarms. This is one way to tune a static program analyzers.
For properties deﬁned in temporal logic a model checker can automatically check
if they are true. The ﬁrst property of the example does not hold for the labeled
CFG, while the associated requirement – a resource is not used on any path following
a free – does hold for the program. This is obviously a false alarm. The reason
is that the model only contains the CFG and the labels, but does not reﬂect the
semantic fact that p is only freed in the last loop operation and never accessed
afterwards. The second property, however, will be true, as there is always at least
one path, namely exiting the loop after the free-operation, where there is no access
to p after free.
Tuning the strictness of diﬀerent checks can be one way to improve the bug/false-
alarm ratio, another option is to add more semantic information and reﬂect the fact
that it is semantically impossible to access p after a free operation. We implemented
a false path elimination strategy based on interval constraint solving that does
exactly this. Hence, our implementation can use the ﬁrst check to ﬁnd all possible
bugs and still rule out many false positives automatically.
We implemented the whole framework in our tool Goanna. Goanna is able to
handle full C/C++ including compiler dependent switches for the GNU gcc compiler
and uses the open source model checker NuSMV [10] as its generic analysis engine.
The run-times are typically in the order of the compilation, i.e., we experience an
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average overhead of 2 to 3 times the compilation time.
With respect to the dimensions introduced in Section 2, Goanna’s analysis can
easily be tuned from a may- to a must-analysis (and vice versa) by changing the path
quantiﬁer of a property. Moreover, Goanna falls into the category of ﬂow-sensitive,
path-sensitive, but unsound program analyzers. This means, Goanna takes the
structure of the program into account by always analyzing along the paths in the
CFG, it reduces the set of feasible paths by false path elimination and approximates
the semantics of diﬀerent C/C++ constructs diﬀerently. This is very much in line
with other modern static program analysis tools [11,12,13]. Although Goanna is not
yet analyzing inter-procedurally the examination of bug classes and tuning options
in the latter remains largely the same.
4 Classiﬁcation of Properties and Bugs
The most commonly asked question about static analysis tools is to quantify the
false positive rate. This is a seemingly straightforward question, but the answer
depends very much on the context.
From a developer’s point of view false positives refer to warnings that are useless
clutter, while true positives are warnings that compel the developer to ﬁx the code.
The bug tracking software Fogbugz, for example, distinguishes between “Must Fix”
and “Fix If Time” bugs. The decision in which category a warning falls, may
depend on the application area, the life cycle of a project, or the maturity of the
code, but is to some extent subjective. A deﬁciency in mature, well tested code
might not be ﬁxed unless there is a serious potential for malfunction, out of a
concern that tampering with the code might introduce new bugs. In contrast, even
minor deﬁciencies are likely be ﬁxed in new code, to ensure maintainability of the
project in the future.
From the perspective of testing it matters if a deﬁciency occurs always or under
certain circumstances only. Bugs that occur predictably in every run are easy to
ﬁnd. The only penalty for ﬁnding them through testing is that valuable resources
have to be spent. In contrast, deﬁciencies that are data or conﬁguration dependent
are much harder to ﬁnd, since it requires a developer to ﬁnd speciﬁc test cases
that expose the bug. Since exhaustive testing is often prohibitive, these kinds of
bugs can go undetected for a long time before they manifest themselves. Data-
dependent deﬁciencies are also a common cause for security exploits. Bugs that
occur always are also called Bohrbugs, while bugs that occur only incidentally are
called Heisenbugs [14]. In static analysis there is a third category of warnings,
namely those that do not cause any functional misbehavior, but reﬂect bad coding
practice. Deﬁciencies in this category cannot be found through testing, but only
through code inspection or static analysis.
From the perspective of formal language theory true positives are warnings that
refer to actual behavior as deﬁned by the program semantics, while false positives
refer to warnings that are logically impossible. This classiﬁcation can either be made
locally, by ﬂow- or path-sensitive analysis, or globally, by context-sensitive analysis.
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/*file: netwerk/streamconv/converters/ParseFTPList.cpp */
92 unsigned int numtoks = 0;
...
98 if (carry_buf_len) /* VMS long filename carryover buffer */
99 {
100 tokens[0] = state->carry_buf;
101 toklen[0] = carry_buf_len;
102 numtoks++;
103 }
104
105 pos = 0;
106 while (pos<linelen && numtoks<(sizeof(tokens)/sizeof(tokens[0])) )
107 {
...
111 if (pos < linelen)
112 {
...
117 if (tokens[numtoks] != &line[pos])
118 {
119 toklen[numtoks] = (&line[pos] - tokens[numtoks]);
120 numtoks++;
121 }
122 }
123 }
124
-> 125 linelen_sans_wsp=&(tokens[numtoks-1][toklen[numtoks-1]])-tokens[0];
Table 1
Warning for a potential out-of-bounds violation on array subscript numtoks in line 125.
With local path-sensitive analysis a warning is a true positive if there exist input to
the function, such that the error path becomes possible. With a context-sensitive
analysis a warning is only a true positive, if the rest of the system is actually able
to provide such an input. If the rest of the system can guarantee that such an input
is impossible, the subsystem can use this as an assumption, and guarantee correct
behavior under this assumption.
For the development of eﬀective static analysis tools neither of these categories
alone are suﬃcient to consider. It is quite easy to produce warnings that are logically
possible, refer to deﬁciencies that manifest itself always, but will not compel a
seasoned developer to change the code. On the other hand, there are warnings
that motivate a developer to ﬁx code, even if in the particular instance it has no
functional consequences, since ﬁxing increases robustness and extensibility of the
code base.
As tool developers we identiﬁed three dimensions to judge the quality of warn-
ings.
Severity: high, medium, low.
Incidence: always, sometimes, never.
Correctness: correct, intra-procedural over-approximation, inter-procedural over-
approximation.
In the remainder we will discuss each of these categories in detail and provide
details to illustrate that the categories are not necessarily correlated, e.g that sever-
ity can be independent from incidence. All examples are taken from the Firefox
code base [15].
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/*file: /mozilla/js/src/fdlibm/e_asin.c */
127 if(ix<0x3e400000) { /* if |x| < 2**-27 */
128 if(really_big+x>one) return x;
129 } else
130 t = x*x;
-> 131 p = t*(pS0+t*(pS1+t*
(pS2+t*(pS3+t*(pS4+t*pS5)))));
132 q = one+t*(qS1+t*(qS2+t*(qS3+t*qS4)));
133 w = p/q;
134 return x+x*w;
Table 2
Warning for an uninitialized variable caused by an accidental “braceless” else-branch
/* file:/obj/dist/include/xpcom/nsWeakReference.h */
90 inline
91 nsSupportsWeakReference::~nsSupportsWeakReference()
92 {
-> 93 ClearWeakReferences();
94 }
Table 3
Warning for non-virtual destructor ClearWeakReferences() in an abstract class.
4.1 Severity
The severity of a warning can be either high, medium or low, and this is typically
how developers categorize bugs. Security ﬂaws, even if they have benign causes
or only occur under very speciﬁc circumstances, can be more severe than errors
that have an immediate impact on functionality. A warning might have medium or
high severity, even if close manual inspection cannot establish conclusively, whether
there is an actual execution producing the bug. Just the chance for the deﬁciency
to create a run-time bug is suﬃcient reason to change the code.
Out-of-bounds errors are typical example of deﬁciencies that are considered
harmful. Table 1 depicts an example. The ﬁrst line comment gives the ﬁle name
and path in the Firefox code base [15]. The code fragment uses an unsigned (pos-
itive) integer numtoks as array subscript, which is initialized to 0 in line 92. The
subscript may be incremented in line 102 and 120, depending on whether certain
conditions are true. Variable numtoks will not be updated in line 102, if the condi-
tion (carry buf len) in line 92 is false. If the while-condition in line 106 evaluates
to false, numtoks will not be incremented, and neither of the if-conditions in 111
or 117 evaluate to false. Thus, it is possible that numtoks is not incremented at
all before line 125. If this case happens tokens[numtoks-1] will access an element
outside of the array leading to a potential buﬀer overrun.
It is interesting to note that out-of-bounds accesses are not necessarily functional
errors. Using the array subscript−1 to refer to the last element of the previous array
in multidimensional arrays is a common and accepted practice. An out-of-bounds
warning for such common use would have a very low severity. This is however not
the case in this example. Variable numtoks is an unsigned integer, which suggests
the index should be bounded to positive integers, and it is unclear if the predecessor
array for tokens is deﬁned in any meaningful way. For this reason this warning was
classiﬁed to have medium severity.
Out-of-bound errors illustrate that warnings of the same category, can in a
certain context be permissable or even common practice. For tool developers this
introduces the problem that it is not suﬃcient to look at the program semantics in
isolation, but it is also necessary to look at the programmers’ intent.
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/*file: /js/src/fdlibm/e_sqrt.c */
142 double z;
...
218 if((ix0|ix1)!=0) {
219 z = one-tiny; /* trigger inexact flag */
...
229 }
...
-> 234 u.d = z;
235 __HI(u) = ix0;
236 __LO(u) = ix1;
237 z = u.d;
238 return z;
Table 4
Warning for use of an uninitialized variable z in line 234, caused by a conditional initialization in line 219.
Table 2 shows as an example of an uninitialized variable. In this example,
variable t will only be initialized in the else-branch in line 130. In line 131 variable
t will however be used regardless of whether it was initialized. From indentation it
appears that the entire block from line 130 to line 134 was intended to be in the
else-branch. In this case, the actual error, missing braces, was caught because it
caused the use of an uninitialized variable. This deﬁciency had been present in the
code for several years, but it was not found through testing or bug reports by users,
since this code fragment is only invoked for a rare platform. Although obviously a
bug, it was classiﬁed to have a low severity.
Table 3 shows a warning for using a non-virtual destructor in an abstract class.
The problem with this construct is that even if a subclass deﬁnes its own destructor,
it will use the destructor of the abstract class. This might have unexpected con-
sequences – unexpected from the developers point of view, consequences that may
include memory leaks. Although the use of a non-virtual destructor in an abstract
class may not result in unexpected behavior if all developers are carefully aware of
this, it might become a legacy problem. Even if there is no eﬀect, and even if the
associated misbehavior never occurs, this warning is considered important enough
for developers to change the code.
4.1.1 Tuning Implications.
One of the conclusions to be drawn from the above observations is that it is necessary
to embed diﬀerent severity levels for warnings in a static program analyzer. While,
e.g., null pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds errors and potential memory leaks
should get a relatively high severity level, code cleanliness such as unused values
or dead code should generally get a lower severity level. However, since diﬀerent
stages of product development might have diﬀerent requirements, it is advisable to
make those categories conﬁgurable and let the user decide which properties should
go into which severity level.
Goanna is highly conﬁgurable, users can place diﬀerent properties into diﬀerent
severity levels and they can also create their own groups. For instance, having a
group for ongoing development and a group for legacy code checks. Goanna can be
adapted according to the user’s needs which are not ﬁxed a priori.
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/* file:dom/src/offline/nsDOMOfflineLoadStatusList.cpp */
495 NS_IMETHODIMP
496 nsDOMOfflineLoadStatusList::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject,
497 const char *aTopic,
498 const PRUnichar *aData)
499 {
-> 500 nsresult rv;
501 if (!strcmp(aTopic, "offline-cache-update-added")) {
502 nsCOMPtr<nsIOfflineCacheUpdate> update=do_QueryInterface(aSubject);
503 if (update) {
504 UpdateAdded(update);
505 }
506 }else if (!strcmp(aTopic, "offline-cache-update-completed")) {
507 nsCOMPtr<nsIOfflineCacheUpdate> update=do_QueryInterface(aSubject);
508 if (update) {
509 UpdateCompleted(update);
510 }
511 }
512
513 return NS_OK;
514 }
Table 5
Warning for an unused variable rv in line 500.
4.2 Incidence
The incidence of a warning refers to whether the associated behavior/bug happens
always, or only for some runs. Finding a bug through testing gets harder if the bug
depends on the conﬁguration and/or input. An example of a input dependent bug
is given in Table 4. Variable z will be used uninitialized if the bit-wise comparison
(ix0|ix1) in line 218 evaluates to false. Finding this deﬁciency through testing
requires the construction of a test input such that both variables ix0 and ix1 are
equal to 0. Static analysis in contrast, applies an abstraction to the possible input,
and is therefore capable of pinpointing the error. A drawback of this approximation
through abstraction is that static analysis might ﬂag deﬁciencies that cannot occur,
either because a certain combination of conditions never occurs, or because a certain
combination of input never occurs. In this example we only have a single condition,
and from the comment trigger inexact flag in line 219, we conclude that the
condition can be false. Otherwise the “inexact” case would be the only case.
Table 5 shows an unused variable. Even though it might seem counterintuitive,
this warning points to a deﬁciency that occurs always; each run of the program
declares the variable, but never uses it. It should be noted that unused variables are
almost never of medium or high severity. These deﬁciencies will only be removed,
if at all, to clean up the code. This is an example of a warning that reports a
deﬁciency that manifests itself always, is semantically correct, but still has a low
severity.
4.2.1 Tuning Implications.
Catching bugs depending on their incidence can best be tuned by the analysis
algorithms used. Must-analysis is good at picking up bugs that will always occur,
while may-analysis picks up potential bugs on single executions. Moreover, a path-
sensitive analysis can ﬁlter out those combinations of conditions that are infeasible
in the execution. To get a better understanding of inputs from other parts of
the program and to increase the precision of the analysis a full context-sensitive
approach should be used.
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Goanna supports the ﬁne tuning of properties by reasoning about some program
path or all paths as described in Section 3. Moreover, Goanna can automatically
eliminate infeasible paths that are caused by a set of excluding conditions. Goanna
does not perform full context-sensitive analysis, yet. However, one can argue that
every function should be implemented defensively, i.e., inputs should be checked
before being used to avoid unexpected crashes.
4.3 Correctness
For a given warning we need to decide if this warning corresponds to an actual
execution with respect to the program semantics. A warning can be spurious, i.e.,
the associated behavior can be logically impossible for the following two reasons:
First, because of an over-approximation of the control ﬂow, and second, because
the context in which a function is used was over-approximated. Table 6 gives an
example of two warnings that are caused by an over-approximation of the control
ﬂow, in particular of the short-circuit operator &&. While the C and C++ standard
leaves the evaluation order for some operators explicitly undeﬁned, i.e., it is compiler
depended, it deﬁnes that the short-circuit operators are executed from left to right.
The concatenation of short-circuit operators in line 894 in Table 6, evaluates ﬁrst
the variable doc, assigns then a value to variable shell, which is then used in the
third expression. To ﬁx the spurious warnings it is suﬃcient to locally reﬁne the
control ﬂow graph to reﬂect this behavior.
Spurious warnings involving the context are much harder to ﬁx. A typical ex-
ample is null-pointer analysis. Pointer arithmetic and aliasing are known to be hard
problems, and depending on the precision of the analysis do not scale to large code
bases. Pointers can be passed through several functions and modiﬁed in each of
them, which requires an inter-procedural and context-sensitive analysis. On the
other hand there is an acceptable level of spurious warnings for a null-pointer anal-
ysis, given that bugs that are caused by null-pointer dereferences are often severe.
4.3.1 Tuning Implications.
Reducing false alarms resulting from intra- or inter-procedural over-approximations
can best be addressed by ﬁner abstractions and specialized analysis algorithms. In
the example above creating a ﬁne grained CFG for the analysis of short circuit
operators can help. Moreover, a specialized inter-procedural pointer analysis taking
aliasing into account can also aid in reducing context-sensitive over-approximations.
Often, incorrect warnings are caused by one of the many exceptions, and corner
cases that exist in C and C++. In this case it is usually suﬃcient to reﬁne the
syntactic description of the properties on an intra-procedural level. This technique
is also eﬀective to cover coding practices that are not according to standard, but
nevertheless common.
Goanna has some experimental features for creating reﬁned CFGs on demand
and tracking pointer aliases through several functions in a modular way. It is,
however, not fully implemented yet and the results in the subsequent section are
obtained without them.
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/* file:/dom/src/base/nsLocation.cpp */
890 nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc(do_QueryInterface(...));
891
892 nsIPresShell *shell;
893 nsPresContext *pcx;
-> 894 if (doc && (shell = doc->GetPrimaryShell()) &&
895 (pcx = shell->GetPresContext())) {
896 pcx->ClearStyleDataAndReflow();
897 }
Table 6
The condition on line 894 generates two spurious warnings. An uninitialized variable warning, and an
unused assignment warning, both of variable shell.
5 Empirical Results
Our implementation is written in OCaml and we use as the back-end model checker
NuSMV 2.3.1. The current implementation is an early version consisting mostly of
intra-procedural analyses for full C/C++. At the moment we have implemented
18 diﬀerent classes of checks. These checks cover, among others, the correct usage
of malloc/free operations, use and initialization of variables, potential null-pointer
dereferences, memory leaks and dead code. The CTL property is typically one to
two lines in the program and the description query for each atomic proposition is
around ﬁve lines because of the need to cover many exceptional cases.
We evaluate our tool with respect to run-time performance, memory usage,
and scalability, by running it on a regular basis over nightly builds of the Mozilla
code base for Firefox. The code base has 1.43 million lines of of pure C/C++
code, which becomes 2.45 million non-empty lines after preprocessing. The analysis
time including the build process for Firefox is 234 minutes on a DELL PowerEdge
SC1425 server, with an Intel Xeon processor running at 3.4 GHz, 2 MiB L2 cache
and 1.5 GiB DDR-2 400 MHz ECC memory.
About 22% of the time is spent on generating the properties including NuSMV
model building, 55% on model checking itself, and about 16% on parsing and 9% on
supporting static analysis techniques such as interval constraint solving techniques.
Some more run-time and scalability details can be found in [9].
The results of the regular runs over the Firefox code base are also used to evaluate
the quality of the warnings, and to document the evolution of the checks over time.
To do this we take a statistically signiﬁcant random sample of the warnings for each
check, and analyze the warnings contained in the sample manually. By addressing
the weaknesses, we have reduced the number of warnings from over 48000 to about
8000. But since this is still very much ongoing work these ﬁgures are subject to
signiﬁcant changes. The reductions were not uniform over the 18 diﬀerent classes,
and the diﬀerent checks also have a diﬀerent potential for further reductions. The
remainder of this section discusses the experiential outcome for a selected group of
checks.
Unused Parameter and Variables.
In the initial experiments unused parameters and variables accounted for more
than 31000 warnings. An inspection of the warnings revealed that most of them
were caused by a structural use of unused parameters and variables throughout
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Firefox. This was obviously an accepted coding practice, to achieve consistency
throughout the code base, rather than being accidental omissions or errors. It is
interesting to note that all of these warnings were semantically correct, pointing to
behavior that occurs always, and thus are true positives from a language semantics
point of view. However, from a user perspective these warnings are of a very low
severity.
We divided the previous check into two checks to improve the signiﬁcance: one
that ﬂags all occurrences of unused variables, and a second that only ﬂags those
that are likely to be unused inadvertently. The ﬁrst check is by default disabled,
and only using the second check reduced the number of warnings to 113, which is
a 99.65% reduction. This was achieved by a slight modiﬁcation of the associated
syntactic requirements. This change removed about 64% of the 48000 warnings,
i.e., we removed a signiﬁcant number of true positives that happened always, were
semantically correct, but of little interest.
Null Pointer Dereference.
One of the most common causes of bugs in C and C++ is the incorrect han-
dling of pointers. The ﬁrst experiments resulted in more than 9000 warnings for
dereferences of potential null pointers. Many of those were caused by a conservative
over-approximation of the possible paths. By improving the syntactic requirements
the number of warnings was reduced to 1200. This number is still too high, and
further improvements will have to come from an improved path-sensitive analysis,
but more importantly from an improved context-sensitive analysis.
To identify a lower bound of null pointer warnings, we divided the one check
into four checks, distinguishing between deﬁnite paths and potential paths on one
side, and between potential and likely null pointers as detectable ny our analysis
on the other hand. First experiments show that a further reduction in warnings of
about 75% is possible, but only a context-sensitive analysis could provide deﬁnite
answers.
Dead Code Analysis.
Dead code warnings are typically of a low severity, and our analysis tries to be
very careful about ﬂagging dead code. From the early experiments on the warning
for dead code were almost always correct. However, we noticed that in a fair number
of cases the dead code was inserted on purpose. A typical example are switch
statements that have a return in each of the cases, which is followed by an additional
return statement. Some compilers complain about a missing return statement, even
if there is one in each case of the switch statement. Hence, developers add code
which is actually dead. This and similar cases of dead code warnings account for
about 25% of the warnings, and can be eﬀectively suppressed by changing the
syntactic requirement. Moreover, programmers often add a comment stating that
some code is dead, but still keep it around.
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Virtual Function Call in Destructor.
While a virtual function call in a destructor does not necessarily cause a problem,
it might result in memory leaks, and is considered bad coding practice, regardless
of the eﬀects. Our analysis of the Firefox code base found 114 instances of such
usages. From those warnings, 105 refereed to the same macro that was used over
and over again, and thus caused as many warnings after preprocessing. This points
to another way to improve the usability of static analysis tools, namely to present
to the user with a concise set of warnings. Except for this duplication of warnings,
the check itself was kept unchanged, as all of the warnings are considered valuable.
Summary.
Overall, we achieved an 83% reduction in false alarms and very low severity
warnings by mostly changing the precision of our rules. This was achieved by tak-
ing care of particular programming styles and strengthening our CTL properties.
Encoding checks as CTL properties and switching from a may- to a must-analysis
easily by changing the path quantiﬁer proved crucial to quickly adjust the granu-
larity where needed.
Currently, our reported defect density is around 3.2 warnings per 1000 LoC for
the Firefox code base. The best state-of-the art checkers provide a defect density
of around 0.35 for Firefox. While there appears to be a signiﬁcant gap between
those two numbers, when neglecting low impact properties such as unused values
and taking into account must-properties only, we achieve a defect density of 0.36.
However, those numbers can only serve as a rough comparison, because we do not
know about the exact checks commercial tools are implementing, their reporting
strategy or the exact techniques used. Nonetheless, understanding programming
styles, severity of bugs and the importance of scalability are in a ﬁrst analysis step
more important than deep semantic analysis techniques.
6 Conclusions
In this work we presented our experiences in tuning static program analysis for large
software systems. In particular we gave a classiﬁcation of properties and bugs based
on our practical experiences in keeping the warning rate down to report relevant
issues. We advocate that a crucial ﬁrst step is to get familiar with programming
styles and the oddities in real code and to ﬁne tune syntactic checks accordingly
instead of applying an expensive semantic analysis right from the beginning. Typ-
ically static program analysis returns a manageable set of warnings. In a future
step, only this set should be subjected to full context-sensitive analysis to keep the
overall analysis scalable.
Related to our work is an evaluation and tuning of static analysis for null pointer
exceptions in Java as described in [16]. The authors show that many null pointer
bugs can be found on a syntactic level without sophisticated semantic analysis. They
show that ﬁne tuning syntactic checks is the key for good analysis results. A similar
conclusion has been drawn in [17] where the authors studied coding patterns and
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use contextual information based on domain knowledge to reduce the false positive
rate. Ayewah et al. evaluate in [18] the static analysis tool Findbugs, on Java source
code. Their test bench contains the code for Sun’s Java 6 JRE, Sun’s Glassﬁsh JEE
server, and portions of Google Java code base. Their ﬁndings are similar to ours,
but they report from a user’s perspective. In our paper we describe the heuristics
that can be used by developers of static analysis tools to increase the quality of the
warnings.
More information about prominent commercial static analyzers can be found
in [19]. The authors compare a number of tools and point out their strength and
weaknesses as well as their experiences of using them within Ericsson. A more
general comparison of some static program analyzers including a discussion on bugs
can be found in [21,20,22].
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